Because interpretations of legislative intent depend on a c areful analysis of the language use in statutory codes, rules and principles for some(prenominal) the construction and interpretation of much(prenominal) codes are carefully observed. In this case of the Commission v. Engineering Students, differences in interpretation regarding the scope and intent of the Human Rights legislation caused a favorable decision for the Commission to be overturned by Mr. Judge Milliken of the Court of Queen's Bench. What principles of statutory interpretation lead to such a judicial reversal?
The phrase from the Code, "or early(a) imitation," can be interpreted according to two principles of interpretation, both in Latin. The applicable phrases are "ejusdem generis" ("of the same kind") and "noscitur a sociis" ("a thing is known by its companions"). Because "the courts cannot assume that the law-makers has made errors or omissions" (Boyd, 1994, p. 63), a literal interpretation of statutes, with counselor from principles such as those above, is mandatory.
Boyd (1994) states that the "ejusdem generis" principle dictates, "ambiguous phrases or clauses go away derive their meanings from the specific context in which they appear (p. 65). Therefore, a look at the phrase, "or other representation," cannot be sprung from its neighboring(a) context. In the Commiss
Glasbeek (1989) is so idea in his op note to the use up that he likens it to a so-called car deal, passed off on an uninformed public (p. 307). He maintains that most people get out answer yes if asked the question, "Do you indispensability fundamental rights?" However, he believes that "an unaccountable elite will be left in charge of determining our basic political rights" (Glasbeek, 1989, p. 310). By "unaccountable elite," he means judges, of course, and he asserts that they will "contribute to the maintenance of a society in which the have-nots are fragmented into competing groups" (Glasbeek, 1989, p. 352).
Boyd (1994) maintains that there have been as m both criticisms as plaudits for the Charter (p. 112).
On balance, however, even critics of the Charter knuckle under that it is wise to entrench political rights and freedoms. Certainly no counsellor of the Charter, H. J. Glasbeek (1989) in his "A No Frills Look at the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, or, How Politicians and Lawyers Hide Reality," begrudgingly admits, "it was wise to entrench political rights and freedoms in exhibition to protect them from capricious, would-be totalitarian legislators" (p. 308).
In his overturn of the pilot light decision in favor of the Human Rights Commission, Mr. Justice Milliken defended his position by noting some literal distinctions between the complainants' appeal and the Code itself. As the Saskatchewan v. Engineering Students document (1989) states, "Mr. Justice Milliken then went on to conclude that the board had erred . . . in failing to have any proper regard for the limiting phrase of the section prohibiting the subject only of "any notice, sign, symbol, emblem or other representation" (p. 612). Milliken pointed out the following discrepancies: (1) the board's complaint refers to articles, notices, symbols, and other representations published in two editions of "The Red Eye"; (2) Code 14(1) is worded differently--"articles" is not used in that section, and neither is t
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